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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Appellee, Discover Bank, filed a lawsuit on November 28, 2011, seeking to
recover amounts owed under a credit card agreement.
2. Appellant filed an answer to Appellee's complaint in December of 2011.
3. Appellant served Appellee with Requests for Admissions on or about December
6,2011.
4. Appellant's Request for Admissions No. 4 stated: "admit that Kevin E. Kendal
has paid off the account that you allege he owes money on, and that he has fulfilled all of
his contractual obligations to you."
5. On March 13, 2012, Appellee filed a response to Appellant's discovery
requests, denying the admissions, including Admission No. 4.
6. Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 22, 2012, based
on deemed admissions.
7. Appellee filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on March 13, 2012.
8. The Appellant did not present any evidence in any of his pleadings refuting the
facts as set for by the Appellee in Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
9. The Second District Court granted Appellee's Motion for Summary judgment
for the amount of $20,601.76 on May 9, 2012.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court acted within its discretion when it granted Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment because withdrawal or amendment of the admission promoted the
merits of the action and did not result in prejudice to the Appellant. Appellee's Motion
for Summary Judgment provided specific evidence to the court that the deemed
admissions were in fact untrue and the trial court did not unilaterally disregard the
deemed admission in granting judgment based on the merits of Appellee's action.

ARGUMENT
I. AMENDMENT OR WITHDRAWAL OF THE APPELLEE'S
ADMISSIONS SERVES THE PRESENTATION OF THE MERITS AND
DOES NOT RESULT IN PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT.
Under Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, matters deemed admitted are
conclusively established unless the trial court, on motion permits withdrawal or
amendment of the admission. "The court may permit withdrawal or amendment if the
presentation of the merits of the action will be promoted and withdrawal or amendment
will not prejudice the requesting party." Utah R. Civ. P. 36(c).
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two step process for reviewing the trial
court's decision to allow withdrawal or amendment of admissions in Langeland v.
Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1060-1061 (Utah 1998). First, the court reviews
4

the trial court's determination as to whether amendment or withdrawal would serve the
presentation of the merits and whether amendment or withdrawal would result in
prejudice to the nonmoving party. Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1061. Second, the court
reviews the trial court's discretion to grant or deny the motion. Id
The Court stated in Langeland that, "To show that a presentation of the merits of
an action would be served by amendment or withdrawal of an admission, the party
seeking amendment or withdrawal must (1) show that the matters deemed admitted
against it are relevant to the merits of the underlying cause of action, and (2) introduce
some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of specific facts indicating that the matters
deemed admitted against it are in fact untrue." 952 P.2d at 1062.
In Appellant's Request for Admission No. 4, Appellant asked Appellee to "Admit
that Kevin E. Kendall has paid off the account that you allege he owes money on, and
that he has fulfilled all of his contractual obligations to you." (See Appellant's Copy of
Discovery Requests in Appellant's Exhibit B to Motion for Summary Disposition.) In
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellee demonstrated that Appellant's
failure to pay the amounts owed under the contract resulted in damages to Appellee and
constitute the basis for Appellee's cause of action. The basis for Appellee's Complaint
and subsequent Motion for Summary Judgment, is that Appellant has not paid off the
account, and that he does indeed still owe money to Appellee. Were Admission No. 4
true, the entire basis for Appellee's case would be removed. Therefore, Admission No. 4
is relevant to the merits of the case.
5

Appellee did not rely on mere assertions to dispute the veracity of Admission No.
4, but presented specific and detailed documentary evidence of Appellant's ongoing
failure to pay the amounts owed to Appellee. Specifically, Appellee provided monthly
billing statements showing all transactions conducted on Appellant's credit card account
and introduced the billing statements via affidavit of Appellee's Personal Representative.
These documents show a deficiency of $17,503.17 as of the date of the final itemized
billing statement. (See Exhibit A and Exhibit B to Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment). Appellee, submitted a denial to Admission No. 4, and by means of the Motion
for Summary Judgment, provided documentary evidence that the Admission is untrue.
Appellee has therefore demonstrated that the amendment or withdrawal of
Admission No. 4 is permissible under Rule 36 by (1) showing that the matters deemed
admitted are relevant to the merits of the underlying action and by (2) introducing
evidence of specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted are in fact untrue.
In Langeland, the Court held that the "test of whether a party will be prejudiced by
the withdrawal of an admission is whether the party is not any less able to obtain the
evidence required to prove the matter which was admitted than he would have been at the
time the admission was made." Id Furthermore, the "mere necessity of proving matters
formerly admitted does not constitute prejudice." Ttf.
Under Appellant's facts, the Requests for Admissions were sent to Appellee on
December 6, 2011, and Appellee's response to those Requests for Admission were
received by Appellant on or about March 13, 2012—a passage of just over three month's
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time. There is no indication that the passage of three months has created any prejudice to
the Appellant. Appellant does not indicate that he is any less able to obtain any evidence or
witnesses that may be required to prove the merits of Appellant's case, than he would have
been had there been no delay in denying the requested Admission. In fact, Appellant has
not produced any evidence whatsoever that would support the Appellant's claim to have
"paid off the account that you allege he owes money on, and that he has fulfilled all of his
contractual obligations to you," but relies exclusively on the deemed Admission No. 4,
which is manifestly untrue. Appellee, therefore can only presume that Appellant is the
sole witness to his claim, and Appellant is clearly able to obtain his own testimony to the
same degree he would have, had Appellee's denial of the requested admissions been
made timely. The Appellant has not demonstrated that withdrawal or amendment of
Admission No. 4 would unfairly prejudice Appellant, and appears to be attempting to
avoid the "necessity of proving matters formerly admitted."
The trial court's decision to permit amendment or withdrawal of admissions fell
within the court's discretion under Rule 36 because it promotes the presentation of the
merits of the action and does not prejudice the Appellant.

II. WHERE THE PLAINTIFF FILED A MOTION PRESENTING
SPECIFIC EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DEEMED
ADMISSION WAS INDEED FALSE, THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IN
RESPONSE TO PLEADINGS AND DID NOT UNILATERALLY
DISREGARD THE ADMISSIONS
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Rule 36(c) provides the trial court with, "discretion to permit withdrawal or
amendment of admissions when the presentation of the merits of the action would be
served and the party obtaining the admissions fails to satisfy the court that he will be
prejudiced in maintaining his action." Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P. 2d
98, (Utah 1985). However, "the trial court does not have discretion to unilaterally
disregard the admissions." Id
The Utah Court of Appeals recognized that a fully briefed motion for summary
judgment was, in substance, a motion to withdraw the admission in issue because the
motion "clearly outlined the parties' respective positions." Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d
555, 558 (Utah Ct App. 1993). The court stated that, "It is well settled that in
determining whether the trial court properly characterized a document before it, we look
to the substance of that document, and not merely to its caption." Id. In Brunetti, the
court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, based solely on his requested
admissions, despite the defendant's failure to respond timely reasoning that, "although
the trial court did not have a per se motion to withdraw before it, its denial of Brunettes
motion constituted authorization for such withdrawal. Because the . . . documents clearly
outlined the parties1 respective positions on the question of withdrawal of the admissions,
and the trial court was fully briefed thereon, it properly treated the various documents as
a motion to withdraw the admissions." Id.
In the case at hand, both parties submitted motions for summary judgment to the
trial court in which their positions were "clearly outlined." Thus, as in Brunetti, the trial
8

court could properly construe the Appellee's motion for summary judgment as a request
to withdraw the admission in question. The trial court did not act unilaterally, but
responded appropriately to the parties' respective motions, finding that the deemed
admission was not supported by any evidence and that Appellee's motion for summary
judgment could appropriately be construed as a motion to withdraw the admission.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, because Appellee has demonstrated that the trial court's decision to
permit amendment or withdrawal of Admission No. 4 promotes the presentation of the
merits because (1) the matters deemed admitted are relevant to the merits of the underlying
case, and (2) the Appellee presented evidence that the matters deemed admitted are in fact
untrue; and that the Appellant will not be prejudiced in maintaining his action on the
merits, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was not in error. Furthermore, the trial
court acted appropriately in construing the Appellee's motion for summary judgment as a
motion to withdraw admissions, and granted the motion based on the merits. Accordingly,
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellee should be upheld.
Dated December 5, 2012.
Brent G. Messel
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